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SECURITY INFORMATION

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MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Office of Operations

A survey of the Office of Operations was made by the Special Assistant to the Director between 24 August and 10 November. This report will deal first with a policy question concerning OO as a whole, *per 24 Aug* and then with matters affecting the several divisions of OO.

MAJOR PROBLEM

The major policy problem to which attention was directed on this survey was organizational; namely, whether OO should or should not continue to be organizationally associated with the covert offices under the jurisdiction of DD/P, a question to which attention was directed in earlier surveys of OSO and OPC.

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
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The administrative functions of OO properly belong in the central administrative agency as stated in the surveys of OSO and OPC. A high degree of autonomous administration is essential to the covert operations. This fact mitigates against the present alignment of OO under DD/P.

Furthermore, it is expected that the operations of OSO and OPC may expand substantially in the near future. The task of supervising these divisions adequately is already so great that DD/P should not be required to accept any responsibility for OO if other feasible arrangements are possible.

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
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RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that OO be placed organizationally directly under the proposed DD/I when appointed and pending his appointment, under DDCI alongside ORR, OCD, etc. It is

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OTHER ASPECTS OF SURVEY

The survey of OO was broad and general and directed to its own internal organization and problems as well as to the proper place of OO in the over-all CIA organization. Following are the observations and recommendations with respect to OO viewed internally:

Strength:

AD/OO has organized his office well to perform the functions set forth in DCI's organizational directive. His separate division chiefs and their assistants and personnel in the higher echelons are all well briefed on their functions, enthusiastic about their work and very loyal to AD/OO. I was exceedingly well impressed both by the personnel and by the way the divisions are functioning. There has been a positive effort to establish closer liaison with major consumers, and to seek a clearer understanding of consumer requirements. A positive effort has also been made to establish better working relations with other offices of the Agency to avoid friction.

Creative imagination has been demonstrated in inaugurating new

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Services, special reports, and participating opportunities of service
to other offices of the Agency.

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OO are correctly assigned to AD/OO was considered and, with
reservations [REDACTED] discussed below, determined
in the affirmative.

Weakness:

The time allowed for this survey did not permit a qualitative appraisal from the point of view of the consumer agencies of the intelligence produced by the several divisions of OO. It is natural to find any devoted intelligence officer convinced of the primary importance of the intelligence he and his staff produce. As the division heads and their assistants are devoted and enthusiastic, they are therefore convinced of the importance of their intelligence production. There is some internal evidence to justify their beliefs. [REDACTED]

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from two of the consuming agencies for their continuance. Contact Division received recently a special commendation from CI for one of its reports. However, the evaluations placed on OOB reports by consuming agencies, when evaluations are requested, are too high to be credible (and are so recognized by Contact Division). The principal weakness of the intelligence effort

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the danger of shooting too wide of the mark. Only 20 percent of Contact Division's reports are pursuant to specific requirements. There is a danger in this type of operation of over-emphasizing quantity. The division chiefs, it should be stated, are aware of this.

Recommendation:

It is recommended (a) that from time to time special appraisals be made among consumers of the value to them of the intelligence output of the respective CO divisions, and (b) that more effort be directed toward obtaining specific requirements.

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
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A. Quantity.

Should the field offices increase their personnel?

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Recommendation.

No intelligent recommendation can be made with respect to this question without a more detailed survey of the usefulness to the consumer of the intelligence produced by the [REDACTED] It is clear, however, that support responsibilities for OSO and OPC are requiring an ever increasing amount of time of the field agents of [REDACTED] estimates that these services now consume approximately 30 percent of the time of all [REDACTED] personnel. To this extent, the effective intelligence production of the field agents is reduced and some compensating increase in personnel would appear to be justified to maintain the present volume of collection.

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B. Functional vs Geographic Organization. An increasing problem of the [REDACTED] is whether to organize its reports functionally or areawise. It is at present

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organized entirely on an area basis with the exception of its [REDACTED] and its reports are disseminated to the respective area desks in consuming agencies. The division chief believes that at least to some extent the intelligence produced by his division would be more useful if it were organized functionally. An experiment is being made in this respect by assigning one man with banking experience to the task of organizing all intelligence relating to money and commodity movements on a functional basis.

Recommendation.

It is recommended that this problem be reconsidered when the Chief, [REDACTED] are prepared to make recommendations resulting from the above experiment.

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[REDACTED] believes that it can perform its support responsibilities for OSO and OPC effectively only if it is told exactly what support is desired. It is the business of the [REDACTED] to know what official in a given organization or institution is responsible in a given area and to cultivate his confidence. When the covert offices need support from any such organization or institution, it can be most effectively rendered if [REDACTED] is told exactly what is expected and desired and then permitted to make the proper contact for the covert official. 25X1A

Recommendation.

It is recommended that no directive be issued with respect to this problem because fundamentally the several offices within CIA can function together efficiently only on the basis of confidence and it is clear that, based upon their experience with the performance of the [REDACTED] 25X1A

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[REDACTED] the covert offices are gradually working more harmoniously with O0. It is my belief that the primary organizational change suggested in the first part of this memorandum will contribute to improving this situation. 25X1C

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Recommendation.

It is recommended that a careful survey be made of the Security Office to determine what can be done to obviate delays in security checks throughout CIA.

F. Clerical Personnel T/O.

Clerical personnel in OO has been seriously depleted to provide personnel for other offices. AD/00 has

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stated that the production of intelligence is seriously threatened by lack of adequate clerical personnel in the central office. The T/O is adequate, but the priorities have favored other divisions.

Recommendation.

It is recommended that personnel be instructed to give CO reasonable priorities until its clerical T/O is more adequately filled. It is folly to have a bottleneck in a production organization costing millions of dollars by reason of a central office clerical shortage.

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
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3. FDD

A. Nature of Service.

The principal problem in FDD relates to whether it is performing a service of common concern. Within limitations, it does so both in its translation division and in servicing other agencies of IAC in the exploitation of foreign documents. The other agencies do maintain

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their own translation departments and will undoubtedly always do so because of the importance to them of having immediately available translators, at least of the major languages. FDD will undoubtedly always be called upon by other IAC agencies for translation of specialized, difficult foreign language material. If FDD were established as a service of common concern, it would, of course, be swamped with translation material, and the division wishes to avoid this. In the exploitation of foreign documents, however, FDD does in fact broadly serve the other agencies. It is not believed that the jurisdiction to refuse the other agencies creates good will when these agencies do in fact use and rely upon FDD and have no other adequate facilities. The problem of priorities within FDD is also affected by its anomalous position as an intra-agency division which in fact performs common services. CIA divisions are thought to suffer by the inability of FDD to demand immediate possession of documents, of which only one copy exists.

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[redacted] It has been suggested in the past that the translation functions be separated from the other FDD functions but the argument of the chief of this division that the

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morale and efficiency of his linguists is greatly increased by his ability to vary their work back and forth between pure mechanical translation and the exploitation of foreign language documents is a very compelling argument.

Recommendation.

It would not require an increase in T/O to make the exploitation activities a service of common concern by NSCID. The T/O is now only 75% filled, because of the difficulty of securing linguists. The principal results of such a directive would be (a) to legalize a situation which does in fact exist (b) to ease the procurement problem for FDD and (c) to coordinate more effectively foreign document exploitation by IAC agencies. A draft directive submitted by AD/00 on 23 July is believed to be acceptable to other IAC agencies, and it is recommended that this be submitted for discussion to IAC.

With respect to priorities, it is recommended that the division chief be permitted to fix his own priorities and make his own peace with his consumers. Only if this procedure should fail to function would it be advisable to establish an IAC Priority Committee.

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
B. Research

A problem has arisen because FDD is requested to produce collated reports involving research which creates an apparent conflict with the evaluating agencies. The division feels that much more valuable reporting would follow if the taboo on research were removed.

Recommendation

It is recommended that the division chief be advised that research is regularly within his jurisdiction where necessary to meet a requirement.

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25X1A Recommendation.

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D. There has been criticism of the time lag between the date of publication and the date of exploitation of documents, which runs from one week to two months. AD/00 has suggested as possible solution air mailing at cost of \$75,000 per annum or placing several multi-linguists in

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Recommendation. Some time lag is inevitable and without more intimate knowledge of the extent of criticism, neither of the suggested solutions is recommended in full at this time. It could be that having its own procurement officers would enable the division to move faster and to cover its desired field more fully and it is therefore recommended that this be permitted.

It is also recommended that on an experimental basis, for a trial period of six months, an effort be made to secure one analyst who would hire local linguists to scan documents in one foreign center, [REDACTED] 25X1A to see if this speeds up the service, and reduces the expense involved in present procedures. Such practice could be extended if both results are achieved, and otherwise dropped.

4. Sovmat. The Sovmat Staff appears to be functioning very satisfactorily. It is in the happy position of producing substantially 100 percent of its intelligence pursuant to specific requirements. [REDACTED]

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